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READING ENTRAILS: ROMER, VMI AND THE
ART OF DIVINING EQUAL PROTECTION*
Larry Cata- Backert
I. INTRODUCTION
Two equal protection cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1996, Romer
v. Evans' and United States v. Virginia2 ("VMP'), were the special focus of
media coverage. Both of these cases were characterized as fraught with political
significance far beyond their respective facts and as the vehicles through which
the Supreme Court might well force a reconceptualization of cultural norms.
The Court would accomplish this reconceptualization by broadly redrawing the
fundamental legal rules governing the way in which society, through its legal
institutions, can behave toward women and sexual minorities.
With these cases, the Court has managed both to satisfy and disappoint
these expectations. The decisions in these cases were fairly direct and easy to
understand. In Romer, six justices3 held that even the most benign standard of
equal protection had been offended by a popularly adopted amendment to the
Colorado Constitution, which repealed all previous ordinances that protected
homosexuals and prohibited "all legislative, executive or judicial actions at any
level of state or local government designed to protect... 'homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."' 4 In VMI, seven
justices5 held that equal protection had been offended by the gender discrimina-
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996. In order to keep as close to the
original flavor of the remarks, the text has been edited sparingly and footnotes have been added.
t Professor of Law, University of Tulsa; B.A. 1977, Brandeis University; M.P.P. 1979, John F. Kenne-
dy School of Government, Harvard University; J.D. 1982, Columbia University. My thanks to Marty Belsky
and Melissa Koehn.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
2. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
3. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, was joined in the judgment by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
4. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30(b)). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas and the Chief Justice, filed a colorful dissent.
5. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kenne-
dy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment. Justice Thomas took no part in the deci-
1
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tory actions of the State of Virginia through one of its institutions of secondary
education, the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), and that its offense was not
cured by the state's insistence that the alternative arrangements it made were
adequate.'
The opinions in these cases, however, are neither straight forward nor
clear. Neither case provided the context for jurisprudential revolution. And
indeed, the majority in neither case expressly indicated any inclination to en-
gage in jurisprudential revolution-making.7 However, in both cases, the Court
chose to speak oracularly, mysteriously, and open-endedly. In the end, the only
people who can be truly happy with the opinions in the cases, other than the
winners in each of the cases, are litigators, and (of course) law professors like
me! Both cases appear to permit the inference that any number of legal, politi-
cal or social policies have now been approved (and others discredited), but
neither case provides any definitive answer. In both cases, the Court has also
taken what had been relatively straight forward legal theory and complicated,
perhaps muddled, the legal analysis thoroughly. As a consequence, like the
suppliants at the ancient oracle at Delphi8 or the devotees of the daily astrolog-
ical predictions in the newspaper, the professorate, lawmakers and litigants who
will try to effectuate what they think has been propounded can safely refer to
the cases to justify their positions, no matter how irreconcilable their positions
might be. Ultimately, the decisions are good for business. They will keep the
populace guessing, keep everyone's hopes up that something (or nothing) has
changed, and keep the inferior courts busy.9
sion and Justice Scalia filed a dissent.
6. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
7. Notwithstanding the dissents' whinings to the contrary. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-1637 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); VMJ, 116 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. The oracle of Apollo was found at the ancient Greek city of Delphi. "Legend has it that, four days
after his birth on Delos, Apollo came to Delphi. After shooting the guardian dragon, Python, he took posses-
sion of the oracular seat for himself. Through his priestess, the Pythia, Apollo uttered prophesies received
from his father, revealing Zeus's will to mankind." ALExANDER LIBERMAN, GREECE, GODS AND ART 21
(1968). A Delphic utterance is still defined as obscure in meaning or ambiguous.
9. And busy they have been, despite the newness of these decisions. For cases relying on Romer, see
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (military discharge under "don't ask, don't tell"
policy; in resisting effort to apply heightened scrutiny to the discharge the Richenberg court noted that the
"Supreme Court applied rational basis review in reviewing a state constitutional amendment adversely affect-
ing homosexuals"). See also Nobozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Of course Bowers
will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in [Romer].'); Able v.
U.S., 88 F.3d 1280, 1292 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to reach the merits of a constitutional challenge and sug-
gesting that Romer may be important in determining "the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to equal
protection cases").
For cases relying on VMJ, see Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding fewer programs for female inmates than for male inmates consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment under VMI); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 183 n.22 (1st Cir..1996) (holding that excep-
tions to law of the case doctrine did not apply to invalidate decision of prior panel in this gender discrimina-
tion action, supporting that determination, in part, by arguing that VMI "adds nothing to the analysis of equal
protection challenges to gender based classifications that have not been part of that analysis since 1979.");
Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (in a
challenge to Dade County's Black, Hispanic, and Women Business Enterprise Programs, the court "cannot say
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It is in this context that I will first explore the rhetorical teasings of VMI
and then survey the magisterial ambiguity of Romer.
II. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA
VMI is a particularly interesting case, because for the first time the Su-
preme Court was asked to confront the issue of the legal relationship of the
sexes within the context of American core political parameters. This wasn't any
old single-sex academy; VMI was the archetype of the model of academy (as a
philosophical and political construct) on which our Republic was built. It repre-
sented the implementation of the wisdom our founding parents distilled from
one of their cultural heroes-Machiavelli. 0 Recall the mission of VIl, a state
supported, all-male institution since its founding in 1839-to develop "citizen-
soldiers" who would be prepared for leadership in civilian life and military
service." That only 15% choose careers in military service"2 might be consid-
ered irrelevant; most graduates went on to assume positions of prominence in
American society. But that is the point of VMI. The institution was meant to
serve as a sorting device; it served as the pool from which the elite could be
drawn. It is no surprise, then, that VMI enjoyed a substantial reputation because
of the accomplishments of its alumni. 3 However, this elite choosing machine
did not include women. Who in 1839 but the ghost of Abigail Adams would
10. Nicolo Machiavelli was widely known at the time of the American Revolution for, among other
things, his defense of the notion of a citizen militia as the bedrock of a stable defense of a republic. See, e.g.,
NICOLO MACHIAVELU, THE ART OF WAR, reprinted in THE CHIEF WoRKs AND OTHERS 561, 563-65 (Allan
Gilbert trans., 2d ed. 1965) (1512). Machiavelli argued:
[N]o principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on
good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the
opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not
founded on its own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects,
citizens or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries.
See NIcOLO MACHiAVELUi, THE PRiNCE, reprinted in 23 GREAT BooKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD 3, 21
(Mortimer Adler ed. & W.K. Marriott trans., 1952) (1513).
George Washington, in urging the creation of a military academy, similarly noted that
a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is at once comprehensive and
complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it, in its most improved
and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a nation. This, therefore, ought to be a
serious care of every government.
George Washington, Message to Congress, in 13 THE WRINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 344-51
(Worthington C. Ford ed., 1889-93)) (1795), reprinted in 3 THE ANNALS OF AMERCA 604, 605 (1968).
11. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. VMI uses an "adversative" method to instruct its students, constantly
trying to instill mental and physical discipline in them. The adversative model features "[p]hysical rigor, men-
tal stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination
in desirable values." See id. at 2270 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va.
1991)). From its establishment in 1839, VMI had been supported by the State of Virginia, and subject to the
control of the state legislature. Id. at 2270.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 2269. These included various national leaders. As a result, VMI enjoyed tremendous alum-
ni support. At the time of the litigation, VMI's endowment was the largest per-student of all public under-
graduate institutions in the Nation. See id. at 2269-70.
3
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have thought otherwise? 4 The model questioned in the 1990s had been "indus-
try standard" for over 175 years.
But as Justice Scalia observed (to his chagrin), the times they are a-chang-
ing.'5 And so, with VMI, we (and the courts) are again, as has so often hap-
pened since the Great Depression, presented with the problem of change. Have
we changed? Is the change real? Does the change affect our institutions? Must
we modify our institutions to accommodate the change? If so, how? The Vir-
ginia legislature could (or should) have addressed these questions and acted
accordingly as a representative of the people. It did not, or not quickly enough.
As a result, in 1990, the United States sued Virginia and VMI, asserting
that their exclusion of women from admission to VMI violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Although some experts at trial
pointed out the benefits of having a co-ed VMI, the District Court ruled in
favor of VMI.17 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Virginia had not
advanced reasons sufficient to justify the continuation of VMI's traditional
gender-based enrollment policies. 8 In remanding, the court suggested three
alternatives: (i) admit women to VMI; (ii) establish a parallel institution or
program, or (ifi) allow VMI to pursue its policies as a private institution and
forego state support. 9
Virginia chose to create a parallel program for women called the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL")." It would be located at the pri-
vate liberal arts school for women-Mary Baldwin College.2' VWIL would
offer the same "citizen-soldier" mission as VMI did; however, VWIL's academ-
ic offerings, financial resources and educational methods would differ from
VMI's.-2 The District Court approved this plan as constitutionally sound.'
14. See Ralph Ketchum, The Puritan Ethic in The Revolutionary Abigail Adams and Thomas Jefferson,
in WOMEN IN AmucAN HIsToRY 49 (Carol V.R. George ed., 1975). Indeed, the Seneca Falls Declaration
was not published until almost ten years after the establishment of VMI. See THE SENECA FALLS DECLARA-
ION ON WOMEN's RIGHTS (July 19-20, 1848), in 7 ANNALs OF AMERICA 438 (1968). This declaration, styled
a "Declaration of Sentiments," modeled after the American Declaration of Independence, together with a
number of resolutions was adopted by a meeting called by Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in Sene-
ca Falls, New York.
15. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. See id. at 2271.
17. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (W.D. Va. 1991). The court based its deci-
sion on Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), where the Court held that "a party
trying to uphold government action based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for
the classification." VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2271. "The defender of the challenged action must show at least that
the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (internal
quotations omitted)). The District Court found that VMI's single-gender environment yields substantial bene-
fits (in terms of diversity) to Virginia's educational system. See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415. Although
women are denied this type of educational experience, the "adversative" type of system could not survive if
women were admitted. This was sufficient justification to continue VMI's policies of female exclusion. See id.
18. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
19. See id. at 900.
20. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (W.D. Va. 1994).
21. See id.
22. See id. Mary Baldwin was previously a liberal arts college. VMI offered degrees in the sciences,
engineering and liberal arts. Furthermore, many of the rigors that made VMI what it was would not be re-
quired at VWIL. The VWIL students would not be required to eat together, nor dress in uniform during
[Vol. 32:361
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Acknowledging that some women might prefer the VMI method of teaching to
the VWIL method, the court stated that "controlling legal principles ... do not
require the Commonwealth to provide a mirror image of VMI for women." 4
The Court of Appeals affirmed.'
Upon granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court considered two issues.
First, it asked whether "Virginia's exclusion of women from the educational
opportunities provided by VMI... deny to women 'capable of all the individu-
al activities required of VIl cadets,' the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment?"'a Seven justices were "exceedingly per-
suaded" that this exclusion denied women the equal protection of the lawY A
seventh, though not "exceedingly persuaded," agreed that under a more tradi-
tional formulation of the standard, equal protection was indeed offended.'
The Court then pondered the question "if VMI's 'unique' situation, as
Virginia's sole single-sex public institution of higher education, offends the
Constitution's equal protection principal, what is the remedial requirement?"29
Seven justices agreed that the remedy proposed by Virginia, the creation of a
sort of consolation prize women's academy, was certainly separate, but it was
not equal enough to prevent further offense to equal protection."
A. Standard, Standard, What is the Standard: Playing Games With
"Exceedingly Persuasive Justification"
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg begins her analysis with a mat-
ter-of-fact rendition of a standard of review which ought to be viewed as any-
school and VWIL would encourage a "cooperative" method of training as opposed to VMI's cherished "ad-
versative" method of training. With respect to VMI's vast alumni network, the VMII Alumni Association
agreed to open its network to VWIL graduates. See id.
23. See id. at 484.
24. Id. at 481.
25. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals decided to
give "greater scrutiny to the selection of means than to the [State's] proffered objective." Id. at 1236. Provid-
ing a single-gender education was a legitimate objective and VMI's "adversative" model was not designed to
per se exclude women, but was not designed to accommodate them either. See id. at 1239. To permit women
to participate in VMI's "adversative" training would destroy the decency between the sexes. See id. The only
way to achieve the legitimate objective of a single-gender educational institution would be to exclude men
from VWIL and women from VMI. The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that this type of analysis
risked bypassing equal protection scrutiny. Therefore, the question becomes "whether men at VMI and women
at VWIL would obtain 'substantially comparable' benefits at their institution or through other means offered
by the State" Id. at 1237 (emphasis added). They found that the two were sufficiently comparable. See id. at
1241.
26. VMJ, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (citing United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
27. See id. at 2287.
28. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
29. Id. at 2274.
30. See id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). On the new separate but equal jurisprudence of the
court with respect to educational institutions, see Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982), where the Court held that a party trying to uphold government action based on sex must establish an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. "The defender of the challenged action must show
at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed [are] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' Id. at 724 (citing Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)).
5
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thing but matter-of-fact: "[A] party seeking to uphold government action based
on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that classifi-
cation."' To satisfy the burden that a justification is "exceedingly persuasive,"
the State must show that the classification "serves 'important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially relat-
ed to the achievement of those objectives."' 32 Furthermore, this justification
must be genuine and one that actually motivates the state, not one that is in-
vented as a result of litigation. The justifications must not rely on "overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females." '33
This is too much for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred. He felt that
the test put forth by the majority introduced an element of uncertainty into an
already established test,34 and confused things by saying the state must demon-
strate an exceedingly persuasive justification to support a gender-based classifi-
cation." He would rather stick with the standard that gender-based classifica-
tions "must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives ''" and leave it at that. The rest of Justice Ginsburg's language gets
too messy for him, and its implications are troubling. The Chief Justice smells a
rat.
Justice Scalia also smells a rat, but one with a different odor. He is partic-
ularly unhappy about the arbitrary nature with which the Court applies different
levels of scrutiny to equal protection challenges.37 And although he has no
problem applying the abstract tests of equal protection jurisprudence, it is his
view that "'when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of
Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and un-
challenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no
proper basis for striking it down.""'3 Justice Scalia exclaims that an "honest"
application of the intermediate scrutiny standard leads to the preservation of
VMI as a single-sex institution.39 Instead, the majority uses the term "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" and interprets it "in a fashion that contradicts the
31. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
32. Id at 2275 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). The established standard was that "[t]o withstand con-
stitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be




37. See id at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. I4 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Justice Scalia points out that VMI comes from a long line of such tradition. Scalia also points out that all of
the federal military colleges were single-sex until 1976, when the people, through their elected representatives,
changed that. See id. "The people may decide to change the one tradition, like the other, through democratic
processes; but the assertion that either tradition has been unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but
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reasoning of Hogan and... other precedents."'' The result reached by the
majority naturally follows: "Only the amorphous 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny,
can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI's single-sex composition is
unconstitutional because there exist several women.., willing and able to
undertake VMI's program."'" The majority's standard of review only "muddies
the waters" and forces the State to "guess about the outcome of Supreme Court
peek-a-boo."'42
Ironically, history appears to be the mother of all three versions of this
singular jurisprudence, and its political use is what separates them. For Justice
Ginsburg, the standard of skeptical scrutiny is one which "responds to volumes
of history." This volume speaks the strains of oppression and emancipation
of women. It is heard in the detailed history of discrimination against women
and evolution of women's rights which Justice Ginsburg offers her audience.
She sees history as a progression to the emancipation and integration of women
into an otherwise minimally changing social order. For Justice Rehnquist, histo-
ry would speak volumes to the injustice of punishing an institution for acting
correctly in accordance with social conventions of the times which are thereaf-
ter overturned. For Justice Scalia, it is the value of patriarchy which speaks
volumes. Justice Scalia sees history as a series of equilibrium positions which
are subject to traumatic disturbances. In this case the disequilibrium affected
single-sex institutions of higher education funded by the state. Once celebrated
and thought quite ordinary, such institutions have been transformed into objects
of suspicion and scorn. Justice Scalia blasts the majority for what he believes is
an opinion "devoted to deprecating the closed-mindedness of our forebears with
regard to women's education."'  What he fears, I think, is the dilution of the
notion of citizen-soldier so crucial to" the success of the state in Machiavellian
terms.45 While Justice Scalia admits that our country's ancestors may have
been insensitive to the feelings and needs of women with regard to education,
he notes that they did leave us with one "virtue"--the First Amendment. As
40. Id. at 2294.
41. Id. at 2294-95. Justice Scalia pressed the point in the usual way: The proper level of scrutiny has
never required that the least restrictive means analysis between the classification and the states interest be
used-only a "substantial relation" must be used. See id. at 2295.
42. Id. at 2295. Having explained that the Court used the wrong standard, Scalia proceeded with an
analysis under what he considered to be the proper standard and framed the issue as "whether the exclusion of
women from Vi is substantially related to an important governmental objective." Id. at 2296.
43. Id. at 2274-75.
44. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. This unease could not be caused by the words of the najority. Justice Ginsburg is not interested in
changing the citizen-soldier character of the VMI experience. The foundations of the Republic are not at
stake, at least from the jurisprudence of Justice Ginsburg. But Justice Scalia should fear. The attack he sees
comes from a different quarter, from those who may find in the citizen soldier model the archetype of oppres-
sive patriarchy which must be rooted out. See Lucinda M. Findley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal or Anti-
Subordination: The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. L.
REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1996).
1997]
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generations and attitudes change, the country's laws can change also, but such
change should come from the democratic system and not the Court.4
With history invincible, if confused-with facts standing as proxy for the
Republic and the place of women within it-with the representatives of the
people indifferent to social reality-the question necessarily becomes a political
one for the Court. Ought it to pronounce social reality as a matter of constitu-
tional law, and if so, by what formula should that expression of social reality be
expressed? This is the level at which the contest is fought.
Justice Scalia thinks he has the answer. Justice Scalia thinks that the ma-
jority has seized the political occasion to declare "single-sex public educa-
tion... unconstitutional"'47 and "functionally dead."'  The Court's new defi-
nition of intermediate scrutiny is in fact no different from strict scrutiny.49 Un-
der this new approach, even single-sex private institutions may not be immune
from constitutional challenge, for financial assistance (tax deductions for chari-
table contributions) might be held to be state action (supporting discrimina-
tion).5" Commentators have begun to take the majority's opinion as a call for
strict scrutiny."
The strength of Justice Scalia's argument depends on how one approaches
the majority opinion. A close reading of VMI as a speech to the American
people could leave one fairly well convinced that the majority means to apply a
stricter form of intermediate scrutiny than that applied before, all the while
adhering to the language of prior cases and the fetish of "intermediate scruti-
ny.)"2 VMI as a rhetorical device is extremely nonoriginalist and yet as coer-
cive as any originalist precept. 3 Consider the call to history, the notion of
"strict liability" for institutions that fail to maintain "state of the art" approaches
to the "social contract." '54 Ponder Justice Ginsburg's suspicion of "officially
pronounced" state motivation, the presumption that programs devised in confor-
46. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2307 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2306.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 2306-07.
51. See Jon A. Soderberg, The "Constitutional" Assault on the Virginia Military Institute, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. RE v. 429, 456-61 (1996).
52. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275-76. Recall that the heightened standard of review doesn't make sex a
proscribed class such as race or national origin. See id. at 2276. Sex classifications may be used to compen-
sate women "for particular economic disabilities suffered," id. (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
320 (1977)); to "promot[e] equal employment opportunity," id. (quoting California Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)); to "advance full development of the talent and capacities of our
Nation's people," ik, but not "to create or perpetuate the legal, social and economic inferiority of women," id.
53. Consider Daniel Ortiz's description of this sort of non-originalism:
A value is to be enforced not because a majority of individuals agrees to it but because it helps de-
fines what the political community is-even when a majority of individuals within the community
does not realize that or does not care. Put simply, nonoriginalism judges values according to their
importance in maintaining the identity of our political community, not according to the extent of their
popular acceptance.
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Price of Metaphysics: Deadlock in Constitutional Theory, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SocIETY 311, 318 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
54. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275; id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
[Vol. 32:361
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mity with community norms subsequently abandoned (at least officially) are
worthy of little credibility."
However, this is not what the majority says it is doing. Read closely, as a
justification for the holding in the particular case, the majority opinion provides
little more than a description of constitutional business as usual. The holding is
palatable in accordance with the current standard. The flights of rhetoric can be
contained. These words are creatures of the particular factual context in which
they arose-and no more. And so the short answer to the "standards" question
is that Justice Ginsburg has equated sex with religion, ethnicity and race. But
her "equating" is a tender flower, hidden under the snow of the words of her
opinion. If a majority of the Court is willing to follow, the path has been laid.
But the path is subtly created; current precedents on intermediate scrutiny re-
main intact if Justice Ginsburg's moving dicta is treated as merely hortatory.
We stand here before a grand piece of evidence of the marvel of herme-
neutics. One can arrive at a substantial change in the content of a text without
altering the words of the text themselves. I take seriously the argument that
Justice Ginsburg has done just that. She certainly meant to push the Court as
far as she could in the direction of strict scrutiny.56 I am less inclined to be-
lieve that the rest of the six concurring Justices are fellow travelers in this par-
ticular hermeneutical journeyY' But that may not matter-the intermediate
courts may take the hint and make it increasingly impossible for the high court
to contain the language of the opinion."
The brilliance of Justice Ginsburg's opinion is not that she was able to
impose strict scrutiny in gender cases-she did not in this case-but that she
was able to craft an opinion that opened up the possibility that the Court might
soon move in that direction5 ' It is to that possibility that a good bit of the
venom of the dissent is directed.
B. Applying the Standard: When is the State Liable For Changing Cultural
Norms?
Two subsidiary points are worth discussion in this case. The first concerns
the timing of the occurrence of constitutional injury, especially when the consti-
tutional injury results from changing legal consequences of changing cultural
55. See id. at 2277-79.
56. Justice Ginsburg has made no secret of this agenda, arguing, for instance, that whether gender classi-
fications are "inherently suspect" is still an open question. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367, 373 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Soderberg, supra note 51, at 455.
57. It is interesting to note, though, that only the Chief Justice challenged Justice Ginsburg's character-
ization of the intermediate scrutiny test (other than Justice Scalia, of course). It is tempting to take this silence
as the opening salvo in the struggle to ultimately reach strict scrutiny in gender cases, drawing on the histori-
cal analogy to the progression (if such it was) from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) ("strict" rational basis)
to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny adopted).
58. See cases cited supra note 9.
59. This would be in keeping with Justice Ginsburg's lifelong strategy for protecting women's rights.
For a discussion of Justice Ginsburg's litigation strategy, see Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality,
One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 335 (1992).
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norms. When did Virginia begin violating the equal protection rights of women
by its exclusionary policies at VMI? Does the question matter? The different
ways in which the justices conceptualize constitutional injury in this case por-
tends a long period of turmoil within the Court in this regard.
The second question relates to the first. Assuming you can determine the
starting point of constitutional injury, what remedies are permitted or necessary
for violation of constitutional gender norms? The real fight here, as Justice
Scalia went to some pains to point out, revolves around the merits of single-sex
education in this country.' The majority clothes this in the language of ade-
quacy of remedy. In the end, the majority does not absolutely close the door to
single-sex education, but it does provide the rhetorical (some would call it
jurisprudential) base for substantially narrowing the circumstances under which
single-sex educational institutions can exist.6 And, indeed, the majority's dis-
cussion of remedies might well evidence that something more than intermediate
scrutiny is at work in VML
Injury. As interesting as Justice Ginsburg's subtle prodding of the majority
on the strict scrutiny issue is her discussion of the triggering of injury, or, more
specifically, the way one is to measure discriminatory intent. The critical ques-
tion focuses on the characterization of conduct which remains unchanging as
social norms change. When does conduct, previously deemed unproblematic,
become significant for constitutional purposes when it, at some point, becomes
constitutionally unacceptable? Here the parallels to the contemporary discussion
of liability for design defects in product liability cases are unmistakable. 2
What VMI makes clear is that the justices are significantly split on the proper
approach. Justice Ginsburg applies something approaching a traditional "strict
liability" approach for design defects, here the design of VMIL3 Justice
Rehnquist argues for adoption of a softer standard based on a "good faith" or
"state of the art" approach.' While applying the different standards in this
case lead to the same result-recall the Chief Justice concurred in the result in
VMI-application of the different standards could have significant effects in
other cases. Unfortunately, these issues were dealt with only indirectly by the
Court, framed around a consideration of the reasons Virginia offered in support
of the continued sex segregation of VM'[ 5
The majority opinion's basis for the rejection of all proffered rationales for
continuing sex segregation provides some insight into the strict liability ap-
proach. Virginia offered a current conditions rationale to support the mainte-
nance of sex segregation at VMI in the future." The majority uses the historic
60. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2293 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 2279, 2286-87.
62. For a discussion of the changing approaches to strict liability as is being developed by the American
Law Institute's Restatement project, see David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict"
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743.
63. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
64. See id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
65. See id. at 2276-77.
66. See id. at 2279.
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realities rationale of sex segregation at VMI to dismiss Virginia's arguments
defending the constitutional possibility of continued or future sex segregation at
VMI. Thus, the majority placed significant emphasis on its view, true enough
for what it was worth, that VMI was not created nor maintained with an eye
toward diversity. 7 It was created at a time when all-male institutions were
common. At no time in Virginia's history is the pursuit of diversity through
single-sex education evident." Diversity was not the "actual state purpose";
rather, diversity is just a "rationalization for actions in fact differently ground-
ed."' The fact that Virginia was not arguing the past but attempting to find a
principled basis for its conduct in the future was dismissed on the basis of the
implication that historic rationales cannot change and new justifications are
presumptively a sham.70
The Chief Justice, in concurrence, attempts a "state of the art" approach.
He agreed that Virginia failed to prove that diversity provided an adequate
rationale for sex segregation in this case, but he does so for reasons critically
different from that of the majority, couched in language with the overtones of
products liability, and very close in spirit to the ideas expressed by Justice
Scalia in dissent.7' Essentially, the argument goes something like this: Sex seg-
regated education was once unproblematic, even when such segregation resulted
in a gendered division of social roles in which the opportunities providing the
greatest possibility of access to the most social power were denied to females.
Institutions which conformed their behavior to this standard could not possibly
have been doing something wrong (as a legal construct). There was only the
intent to conform to permitted, even celebrated, conduct norms. Their institu-
tions were, in this sense, state-of-the-art. The institution's conduct becomes
"bad" (that is actionable) only when the intent to be "bad" forms, and that
cannot occur until the time when it is reasonable to infer that the manifestation
of such intent was (at least legally) possible. That inference may be supported
by a reasonable review of current conditions, but it may also be evidenced by
the conduct of those institutions with a duty to warn-in this case, the courts.'
Put in the language of the case, the Chief Justice argued that the decision
in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan' was the first time VMI or Vir-
ginia should have been on "notice that VMI's men-only admissions policy was
open to serious question."74 Therefore, no negative inferences should be drawn
67. See id.
68. See id. at 2277.
69. Id. at 2277. See also id. at 2279 ("A purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational op-
tions ... is not served by VMII's historic and constant plan... to afford a unique educational benefit only to
males.").
70. The use of history and tradition in defense of change and to resist new arguments supporting contin-
ued sex segregation provides a wonderful moment of table turning on Justice Scalia. Here is history as paro-
dy. The irony could not have been lost on Justice Scalia.
71. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2287-91 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
72. Cf. RESTATENMENT (THIM) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABMTY § 18 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1996).
73. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
74. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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from the State's inaction prior to that decision.' However, it is proper to draw
such inferences from conduct occurring after Virginia was put on notice that its
single-sex institutions might no longer meet current constitutional standards.
Since Hogan placed VMI on notice in 1982, Virginia should have taken steps
to remedy an anticipated challenge to VMI's admission policy. However, the
governing body of VMI studied the situation and decided to do nothing.76
"Had Virginia made a genuine effort to devote comparable public resources to a
facility for women, and followed through on such a plan, it might well have
avoided an equal protection violation."'
Justice Rehnquist's approach is both alluring and yet ultimately
unsatisfying. Its allure lies in the subjective "fairness" of the measure. There is
something to the notion that single-sex institutions were not constitutionally
problematical for a long period of our history (however wrongheaded that might
now seem to us). A standard which would penalize conduct post facto tends to
problematize all conduct. How can we ever be sure that following current con-
duct norms will not subject us to liability in the future? Where the "technology"
of the law changes, as it has with increasing frequency since the 1940s, how
can the state ever be sure that something it does today will not be the basis of
liability tomorrow?7 He suggests a standard imposing liability only on the
basis of proof of conduct from the time the action foreseeably became suspect.
And yet Americans, and particularly the American Congress, have devel-
oped a taste for the very proposition that actors, and especially state actors, may
be penalized civilly post facto. Consider our approach to environmental liabili-
ty.' As a result, the Chief Justice's "products liability by analogy" approach
may be unsatisfying. When it comes to fundamental rights, we will insist that
the state bear the risk.0 And why not? As the Chief Justice himself recogniz-
es, it is the state which not only fashions the conduct challenged through its
legislative branch, but provides the warning that the conduct at issue may no
longer fall within the strictures of the organic law by the pronouncements of its
judicial branch.
Remedies. Virginia offered two major rationales supporting the continua-
tion of single-sex (male) education at VMI. First, they argued that "single-sex
education provides important educational benefits.. . [and].. . contributes to
diversity in educational approaches."'" Second, they contended that VMI's "ad-




78. Consider this by analogy to the "state of the art" problem in products liability law. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABILrrY § 18 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
79. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601-9675 (1996). For a discussion, see, for example, William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary
Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35
(1995).
80. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963) (state must provide indigent criminal defendant with
counsel-applied retroactively).
81. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996) (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners 20).
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necessarily have to be modified if women were to be admitted.82 These chang-
es would be so radical and drastic as to deprive men of the opportunities and
eliminate the reason that women would want to go there.
The majority applies the common rule for determining the appropriate
remedy for a constitutional violation-the remedy must closely fit the violation,
and "[i]t must.., place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or
advantage in 'the position they would have occupied in the absence of [discrim-
ination]."'' 3 The majority framed the constitutional violation in this case as the
exclusion of women from a VMI education. While the Court noted that single-
sex educational facilities can benefit some students and serve the public
good, 4 in this case the alternate offered by Virginia in the form of VWIL was
indeed separate but unequal."
For the majority, the idea that admission of women would destroy VMI's
system of training and stature is an exaggeration. Justice Ginsburg dismisses
this argument, noting that no such dreadful outcome has befallen the various
federal military academies which have admitted women. 6 VMI is free to
maintain its adversative method of training-women will come and succeed
even in that environment. Ginsburg's subtext is simple. She has no quarrel with
the citizen-soldier model for the Republic; she merely expects that such a model
will be available to all women who seek to test themselves against the rigors of
such a regimen. Since she has no quarrel with the mission or methods of VMI,
and believes that women as individuals ought to be given the chance to fail or
succeed in such an environment, the state's justifications for the exclusion of
women are not "exceedingly persuasive."
Justice Rehnquist arrives at the same conclusion, but for vastly weaker
reasons, reasons substantially more subversive of tradition than those of Justice
Ginsburg. The Chief Justice suggests that the preservation of the adversative
method of training does not serve an important governmental objective. This
method is devoid of evidence that it is "pedagogically beneficial or is any more
likely to produce character traits than other methodologies."" He appears to
82. See id.
83. Id. at 2282 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). This issue had been addressed
by some commentators. See, e.g., Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science
Evidence: Reading the 'Record' in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN's STUD.
186 (1996).
84. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
85. The majority concluded that VWIL does not offer the same experience as VMJ. It "affords women
no opportunity to experience the rigorous military training for which VMI is famed." Id. at 2289. Instead,
VWIL offers a "cooperative" method of education. VWIL students do not experience the barracks type of
lifestyle either. See id. Furthermore, since the VWIL students are not presented with the pressure and stress of
VMI training, they will not know the "feeling of tremendous accomplishment" common to VMI cadets. See
id. Additionally, VWIL does not equal VMI in many other areas. "VWIL's student body, faculty, course
offerings, and facilities hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL graduate anticipate the benefits associated
with VMI's 157 year history, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni network," Id. at 2284. For an
extensive discussion of the comparative deficiencies of VWIL, see id. at 2284-86. Essentially, the VWIL
program is a "pale shadow" of VMI and their resources and opportunities. "[V]irginia has not shown substan-
tial equality in the separate educational opportunities the state supports at VWIL and VMI." Id. at 2286.
86. See id. at 2281.
87. Id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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hint that, as with the benefits of a single-sex education, had there been merit to
the adversative methodology it might well have survived as a justification. But
he has it all wrong. The problem isn't the methodology. The problem is the
assumption that women are incapable of succeeding under it. Justice Ginsberg,
following the traditional liberal feminist axiom that men and women are equal,
rejects this argument out of hand.88 The Chief Justice, ironically appearing to
adopt a cultural feminist approach, 9 presumes that women are different, meth-
odology is gendered, and that gendered methodology can only survive if the
state can show that it is important for men!
And so, for the Chief Justice, the majority has misdefined the constitution-
al violation." By doing so, they imply that the only adequate remedy would be
to admit women to VMI. But the violation was not the "exclusion of women"
from VMI. The real violation was in "the maintenance of an all male school
without providing any-much less a comparable-institution for women."'
Framed this way, "separate but equal" could be a viable method of satisfying
the minimal requirements of equal protection; "[ilt would be a sufficient reme-
dy, I think, if the two institutions offered the same quality of education and
were of the same overall caliber." In the end, however, Virginia did not pro-
vide an adequate remedy for even this constitutional violation.
As far as Justice Scalia is concerned, though, Virginia has satisfied the
intermediate level of scrutiny, when the standard is properly applied. Therefore,
the Court's reasons for finding otherwise are "irrelevant or erroneous as a mat-
ter of law, foreclosed by the record in this case, or both. ' " To Justice Scalia,
instead of focusing on the evidence of Virginia's witnesses, the majority ignores
it in favor of "their view of the world."94 So reduced, Justice Scalia can take
comfort in what has become his jurisprudential signature-the Court is playing
politics, and that lust is best satisfied in Congress, not within the Court.
For the reasons Justice Scalia finds the majority opinion political, he finds
the Chief Justice's approach wholly beside the point. The adversative model
serves a pedagogical benefit and thus justification for an important governmen-
88. While Virginia justified sex segregated schools as necessary due to the important differences be-
tween men and women, see id. at 2289, Justice Ginsburg emphasizes that "generalizations about 'the way
women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to wom-
en whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description," id.
89. There has been a substantial body of writing on relational feminism. Its genesis is largely traced to
the work of Carol Gilligan. See CAROL GILAN, IN A DIFERENT VOiCE (1982).
90. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2289 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). The ma-
jority defines it as "the categorical exclusion of women from an extraordinary educational opportunity afford-
ed to men." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia points out that the rationale adopted by the majority
that some women were capable of meeting the requirements of VMI amounted to an adoption of strict scruti-
ny and is inappropriate in sex discrimination cases. See id. He also argued that the majority opinion's determi-
nation that Virginia has failed to offer women the opportunity to be educated under the adversative training
model completely disregarded the findings of the District Court and the testimony of expert witnesses as to
the merits of a single-sex education. See id. at 2300.
94. Id. The Court found that the "findings" were grounded in opinions "about typically male or...
female tendencies" and essentially disregarded these gender based classifications. Id.
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tal interest "was a given in this litigation."95 The women who were applying to
VMI did not want to go there because it was all male (the institution would not
be all-male once they matriculated). They were applying to experience the
"distinctive adversative education that VMI provided." But this conclusion
does not lead him to Justice Ginsberg's point of view. Justice Scalia notes that
none of the United States' experts testified that VMI's approach was appropri-
ate for women. VMI's goal of "learning, leadership, and patriotism" is therefore
not "great enough to accommodate women."
For Justice Scalia, VMI is in line with other decisions of this term in which
"a self-righteous Supreme Court, acting on its Members' personal view of what
would make a more perfect Union.... can impose its own favored social and
economic dispositions nationwide."' In Justice Scalia's view, VMI serves to
again narrow the ambit of self-government reserved to the people by the found-
ers of the Republic. And his view is delivered in operatic style. Indeed, on
first reading, the dissent struck me much as does Electra's "mad" aria in
Mozart's Idomeneo." "Oh smania! oh furie! of disperata Elettra! ... Vedro
Idamante alla rivale in braccio? . . . Ah no, il germano Oreste ne'cupi abissi io
•vio seguir, or or compagna m'avrai la dell'inferno, a sempiterni guai, al pianto
eterno.' 0
Having lived to see the Republic in the hands of his jurisprudential rivals,
there is nothing to do but to follow his "brothers" on the bench to the bottom-
less pit of hell. And to my mind, in the realm of equal protection, this proved
particularly true with the far more significant equal protection case decided this
past term, Romer v. Evans." It is to this version of Justice Scalia's personal
vision of Hell that I turn next.
95. I& at 2304.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2301. Those educational values are ones shared by all of Virginia's schools. VMI only de-
scribes them in a particular manner-in accordance with their military character. See id. Scalia finds that this
particular "mission is not 'great enough to accommodate women."' Id. (internal citations omitted). Scalia finds
that if the majority view is applied generally, "it means that whenever a State's ultimate objective is 'great
enough to accommodate women' ... then the State will be held to have violated the Equal Protection Clause
if it restricts to men even one means by which it pursues that objective .... Id. (internal citations omitted).
It was untrue that VII would not have to change very much to admit women. The key elements of the adver-
sative model revolve around such aspects as a total lack of privacy, barrack style living, no locked doors or
window coverings and regulation of minute details of behavior. Additional changes would include physical
training modifications and "aggressiveness of the current program." Id. at 2302. Justice Scalia noted that both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that these changes would substantially alter the "egalitarian
ethos that is a critical aspect of VMI's training." Id.
98. Id. at 2308.
99. See id.
100. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, IDOMENEO: RE DI CRETA, libretto by Giambattista Varesco (1780).
101. IDOmENEo: RE DI CRETrA, supra note 101, at Act III, Scene X, No. 29 Recitative (Elettra) ("Oh
frenzy! Oh fury! Of desperate Electra! Am I to see Idamante in the arms of my rival? Oh no, I shall follow
my brother Orestes into the dark deep; soon you shall have me there in the bottomless pit as your companion,
ever suffering, ever weeping.").
102. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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II. ROMER V. EVANS
Several Colorado municipalities passed ordinances effectively banning
discrimination in housing, employment, education, public accommodations and
health and welfare services."°a In due course, these provisions were extended
in some Colorado jurisdictions to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Unhappy with the result, organized special interest groups were able to put on
the ballot, and the voters of Colorado adopted, Amendment 2 ("the Amend-
ment") to the Colorado State Constitution."°4 The Amendment repealed any
previous ordinances to the extent they protected homosexuals and prohibited
"all legislative, executive or judicial actions at any level of state or local gov-
ernment designed to protect... homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships.' ' 5
Following adoption of this referendum, a number of people in the purport-
ed class covered by the Amendment, the Colorado municipalities, and govern-
ment entities whose non-discrimination provisions were voided under the
Amendment brought suit in Denver state court seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief from enforcement of the Amendment."°6 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, which was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.'07
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Amendment was subject to strict
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because "it
infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the politi-
cal process, ''I°" and remanded for further proceedings. The state district court
then found the state's interests in the Amendment insufficient and enjoined its
enforcement, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed this ruling."° On re-
view, the Supreme Court of the United States also affirmed, but on different
grounds.
A. Just What Are they Trying to Do, Anyway?
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found the state's argument that
the Amendment really does no more than put homosexuals in the same position
103. See id. at 1623. For example, the Court lists DENVER REV. MUNICIPAL CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91 to
28-116 (1991); ASPEN MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987).
104. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632. It sets out:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of
Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any or its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONsT. art. 11, § 30(b).
105. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)).
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as all other people "implausible."' . After noting the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado's finding that the Amendment's "ultimate effect" would be comprehensive
prohibition of protection for homosexuals, he reiterates that the Amendment
actually withdraws certain legal protections from homosexuals without realistic
hope of their reinstatement."' Further detrimental consequences of the
Amendment include "nullifi[ed] specific legal protections for [homosexuals] in
all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare
services, private education, and employment."" 2 Additionally, the Amendment
would rescind prohibition of discrimination against state employees based on
sexual orientation, and would repeal laws prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation at state colleges."'
In discussing Colorado's state and local government history of anti-dis-
crimination protection, the Court points out that several localities protect against
discrimination of such traits as "age, military status, marital status, pregnancy,
parenthood, custody or a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental
disability of an individual or of his or her associates-and, in recent times,
sexual orientation,""' 4 in addition to the traditionally protected classes of sex,
race, ancestry, and illegitimacy. Essentially, the Amendment would forbid
"the[se] safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint."".. Pre-
dicting the impact of the Amendment, the Court further noted that it may not be
limited to "specific laws passed for the benefit of gays and lesbians.""' 6 They
determined that the Amendment could, if read broadly, deprive homosexuals of
protections against arbitrary discrimination in both governmental and private
settings. '
7
Next, the Court addressed Colorado's argument that the Amendment was
"intended to conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect class-
es.""8 Here, the Court indulged the assumption that homosexuals could find
protection in laws of general application but nevertheless found that the Amend-
ment "imposes a special disability upon those persons alone.""' 9 Homosexuals
would be barred from safeguards of anti-discrimination laws and could only
seek protection by succeeding in the difficult task of amending the state con-
stitution, or by passing "helpful laws of general applicability."'' Essentially,
the Amendment withholds "protections against exclusion from an almost limit-




112. Id. at 1626.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 1626.
115. Id. at 1627.





121. Id. at 1627.
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With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court acknowledges that
equal protection must co-exist with the reality that legislation does classify
people and as a result disadvantages various groups."2 Therefore, all that is
needed is a rational basis here for classifications based on sexual orientation.
But what sort of rational basis? At a minimum, the majority seems to favor an
inquiry as skeptical of the rational tie between legislation and purpose as that
used to analyze the rationale for single-sex military education in VMI (though
not by any means suggesting that the rationale need be exceedingly persuasive).
Prepared to be skeptical, the majority found that the Amendment lacked a ratio-
nal relationship to a legitimate state interest.
First, the Amendment attempted to identify a group of people by a single
trait and then broadly deny them protection." The Court expressed that such
an attempt to prohibit a class of people the right to seek protection of the law is
unprecedented and not within our "constitutional tradition."'24 Kennedy further
noted that the idea of a government open to all is central to equal protection
jurisprudence. Hence, laws which effectively single out one class of citizens for
"disfavored .legal status" are rare."2 Anticipating Justice Scalia's dissent,
Kennedy explained that Davis v. Beason'6 does not stand for the proposition
that the Amendment is within our "constitutional tradition." In fact, Davis was
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio" regarding its denial of voting rights to
those advocating polygamy.' s Further, Kennedy held that Davis's deprivation
of a group's right to vote because of their status "could not stand without sur-
viving strict scrutiny.'
129
Second, the Court noted that the Amendment was really "inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects."'30 Desire to harm a politically
unpopular group is not a legitimate state interest.'' Colorado's argument that
the Amendment offers respect for other citizen's freedom of association and
forwards the state's interest in conserving resources to fight other discrimina-
tion does not meet this requirement. Actually, the Court found that the Amend-
ment was "divorced from any factual context from which [the Court] could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests" and was actually an attempt
to make homosexuals "unequal to everyone else."'3
The majority opinion generated a particularly blistering dissent from Jus-
tice Scalia. He begins by rejecting the majority's assertion that the Amendment
was a "bare .. . desire to harm." Rather, it was an attempt by the majority of
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1628.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In Davis, the Supreme Court approved an Idaho statute barring polygamists or
advocates of polygamy from voting or holding office. Id.
127. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (mere advocacy protected under First Amendment).
128. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
129. Id. at 1629.
130. Id. at 1627.
131. See id. at 1628.
132. Id. at 1629.
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the people of Colorado to "preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts
of a politically powerful minority... ."" He asserts that the Amendment pro-
hibits special treatment of homosexuals and nothing more; the import of the
Supreme Court of Colorado in Evans II is that the general prohibitions against
arbitrary discrimination "would continue to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of homosexual conduct as well."' 34 Effectively, they could not be discriminat-
ed against because they were gay, but they would not be afforded any "extra"
protections. For Scalia, all the Amendment does is deny homosexuals "preferen-
tial treatment" unless they amend the Constitution. 5 Scalia illustrates the "ab-
surdity" of the majority's assertion through his 'municipal contracts' exam-
ple;"'36 equal protection is not denied when a group "to obtain advantage...
must have recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of political
decision making than others."'37
With what for me amounted to a strange whiff of the European Jew-baiting
tracts of another age, refurbished, of course, for use against a different kind of
"Jew,"'3 Justice Scalia went on to explain that as many states (Colorado in-
cluded) decriminalize homosexuality, other problems arise. Homosexuals tend to
reside disproportionally in certain communities, have high disposable incomes
and become politically active with regard to homosexual causes, devoting this
power to societal acceptance of homosexuality.'39 As a result, the Amendment
sought to resolve many Coloradans' concerns by having a statewide, single
issue vote.
After quoting the Court's reasoning for finding this legislation unconstitu-
tional," Scalia dismissed them as wholly false. When a state law prohibiting
or disfavoring certain proscribed conduct is passed, the adversely affected group
(such as smokers, drug addicts, motorcyclists or gun owners) are prohibited
"from changing the policy.., established in 'each of [the] parts' of the
state.''. Scalia also pointed to several state constitutional prohibitions of po-
lygamy as authority that it is within our "constitutional tradition" for a "majori-
ty of citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide, against the
efforts of a geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to
undermine it."' 42 If the Amendment is unconstitutional, then several state con-
133. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1630.
135. See id.
136. See id. He explains that a law prohibits awards of municipal contracts to relatives of the city mayor
unless they (relatives) persuade the state legislature (unlike other citizens) to award the contract. To Scalia,
this is not a denial of equal protection.
137. Id.
138. Didi Herman has begun to explore the ways in which the anti-gay rhetoric of recent years has begun
to bear an uncanny resemblance to the old Jew-baiting tracts of fundamentalist Christian groups. See DiDI
HERMAN, NORMALCY ON THE DEFENSIVE: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S ANn-GAY AGENDA (1996); see generally
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1996).
139. See id. at 1634.
140. Specifically, that such a law is "unprecedented" and "not within our constitutional tradition." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1635.
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stitutional provisions prohibiting polygamy must also be found unconstitutional,
and such nonconformity "must be permitted in these states on a state-legislated,
or perhaps even local-option, basis."'43 Furthermore, Scalia points out that
such anti-polygamy provisions were required by the U.S. Congress as a requi-
site for admission of certain states into the Union,'" and that the Court had
previously approved an Idaho Territory provision which denied polygamists the
right to vote. 4 Scalia concludes by once again attacking the majority, accus-
ing them of taking sides in the culture war. He repeats that the Amendment
does not "disfavor" homosexuals, but only denies them preferential treatment.
The state's interest, prevention of "piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morali-
ty" of a majority of the people, was an "appropriate means to [a] legitimate
end."'14
B. Searching for Meaning in Romer
The problem with Romer, of course, is in its meaning. It is exceedingly
difficult to search for meaning in Romer with any degree of confidence. It is
even harder to divine the utility of the case. As a rhetorical device, the majority
opinion is a study in majesty. It is Handelian in its oratory, truly the voice of
the Divinity speaking to its children. Truly, it is the voice of the Divinity
speaking to its children. As rhetoric it works well to camouflage the ambigu-
ities inherent in the stately procession of the words of that opinion. More im-
portantly, Justice Kennedy's Olympian tone effectively casts the dissent, not in
the role of Milton's Lucifer, 47 but rather in that of the archetypal mad heroine
of opera seria. " "Tutte nel cor vi sento, Furie del crudo averno, Lunge a si
gran tormento, Amor, merce, pieta. Chi mi rubo quel core, Quel che tradito ha
il mio, Provin dal mio furore, Vendetta e crudelta."'49 So reduced, the power
of its argument is lost in the "mad" lust of its rhetoric, and it can be avoided by
that large number in the Academy with a taste for the antiseptic.
143. Id.
144. They include Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Utah. See id.
145. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
146. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637.
147. John Milton, Paradise Lost, in THE COMPLErE POEMS OF JOHN MILTON WRrrEN IN ENGuSH 89-
362 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909) (1658-1663). There is, though, a touch of Lucifer's famous speech in the
dissent:
... Hail horrors! Hail,
Infernal World! and thou, profoundest Hell,
Receive thy new possessor - one who brings
A mind not to be changed by place or time.
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.
Id. at 96.
148. See IDOMENEO: RE DI CRETA, supra note 101. The passion is evident; its flames, however, incinerate
the argument Justice Scalia attempts. In the end, all we can really recall is the passion ... and the calm,
sensible progression of the arguments of the majority.
149. See id. at Act 1, Scene VI, No. 4 Aria (Elettra) ("All of them I feel within my heart, the furies of
crude Hades, far removed from these torments are love mercy and pity. He who has stolen that heart, He who
has betrayed (that) which is mine, shall feel in my fury revenge and cruelty.").
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20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/2
DIVINING EQUAL PROTECTION
And so the Divinity speaks. Phrases redolent with meaning pour from the
pages of the opinion, promptly to be scattered by the winds of obfuscation. And
into the void created by this Olympian rhetorical clearing rush those with an
extreme need for guidance, and those with the even greater need to provide the
definitive interpretation of that which cannot be interpreted directly. Those who
want to draw positive value from the decision for this or that ideological, cul-
tural or political program have been far less reticent in the months since the
decision has come down. Some have argued that Romer is a "seminal decision
in the jurisprudence of equal protection for gay people."'50 Like Reed v.
Reed.' for females, Romer will lead to some sort of heightened scrutiny for
laws which adversely impact gay people.' It is also possible to argue that the
Court employed what has been described as a new tier of equal protection anal-
ysis-rational basis with teeth.'53 Andrew Jacobs argues that "Romer heralds:
(1) a muscular rational basis review that may invalidate civil laws aimed at the
class of gays; (2) a significant possibility of overruling Bowers; and (3) a great-
er solicitude for gay claims in many areas of the law."'5 4
Others take a more cautious approach. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry
have recently argued that the case merely articulates a far-reaching but narrow
principle which they christen the pariah principle. "This principle, in a nutshell,
forbids the government from designating any societal group as untouchable,
regardless of whether the group in question is generally entitled to some special
degree of judicial protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like left-
handers (or, under current doctrine, homosexuals)."'55 This is a minimalist ap-
proach to the potential inherent in the hortatory expressions of the majority
opinion, which seeks to avoid the problems which a broad interpretation of the
majority's "rational basis" analysis might pose.'56 In a similar vein, Akhil
150. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE LJ. 247, 248 (1996).
151. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
152. See Wolff, supra note 150, at 248. See also Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to
Speak. Litigating 'Outness' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995). Art Leonard
has eloquently argued that
Romer was a case in which the Supreme Court did not discuss or decide the issue of the level of
scrutiny. Romer was a case in which the Supreme Court did decide that in this particular case...
there was no rational basis to sustain the [A]mendment.... The Court did not say, did not decide,
and did not address, the issue of what level of scrutiny in general should be used in cases about anti-
gay discrimination by state actors. It did not. We must not fall into the trap of saying that Romer
establishes a rational basis standard for gay equal protection cases.
Letter from Art Leonard, Professor of Law, New York University Law School,'to queerlaw listserv (December
5, 1996) (on file with author).
153. See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name,
62 IND. L.. 779 (1987) (criticizing the "rational basis with bite" standard).
154. Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument
Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 893, 963. For a critique of rational basis with teeth as an additional
category, see Pettinga, supra note 153.
155. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257, 258 (1996).
156. Indeed, this approach highlights the singular importance of Justice Scalia's dissent for those who
value theory and process purity. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 155, at 263. How do you habilitate the
majority opinion without becoming entangled in Justice Scalia's quite valid point that the rational basis analy-
sis of the majority was anything but? See Romer v Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). The entanglement problem is particularly acute for those who do not wish to see in the opinion a move
to heightened scrutiny for "homosexual" issues.
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Amar has reconfigured this pariah principle more formally as a constitutional
event implicating the ancient "attainder principles" of the federal Constitu-
tion."5 The majority opinion reflected the rejection of a law imposing unprec-
edented disabilities on a group with little in the way of reason to support it, and
with the substantial effect of attainting people by reason of membership in the
proscribed group.
The narrowest reading suggests that the majority opinion reflected the
rejection of a law imposing unprecedented disabilities on a group with little in
the way of reason to support it. Animus may well be a result and even a per-
missible result of reason, but reason must support the animus. This might well
be one of those cases where rational basis actually suffices to invalidate a stat-
ute.' Here, a variant of this reasoning goes, the state was unable to offer rea-
sons even arguably connected with the disability and (more importantly) its
breadth. 9 Passion, alone, is insufficiently rational to support the disability. In
the future, the state will be more careful.
And then there is Robert Bork. He finds no "logical or constitutional foun-
dation .for the majority's decision. ''""e Taking his cue from the dissent, he
finds in Romer little more than naked politics. The decision reflects the power
and ability of the homosexual elite and their worldwide conspiracy to substitute
their culture for that which preceded it. For Bork, Romer does for gay people
what Roe v. Wade' did for heterosexual (im)morality. In both cases, the
"Court, without authority in the Constitution or any law, has forced Americans
to adopt the Court's view of morality rather than their own."'
For me, though, Romer exudes (and quite perversely, too) that all too
familiar aroma of Sunsteinianism. I refer, of course, to Professor Cass Sunstein
and his quite accomplished political defense of that Guess Who's Coming to
Dinner63 partisan process liberalism."6 Like the country club republicans of
the late 1950s, the process liberals of the 1990s have midwifed a bizarre apo-
157. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203
(1996); but see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About
Professor Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 236 (1996).
158. See, e.g., Constitutional Law Scholars Attempt to Distill Recent Supreme Court Term, 65 U.S.L.W.
2274, 2277 (October 29, 1996) (remarks by Jesse H. Choper).
159. See Hills, supra note 157, at 236 (arguing that Amendment 2 met its demise on the basis of the
breadth of the disabilities it imposed).
160. ROBERT H. BOPRK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND THE AMERICAN
DECLINE 114 (1996).
161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. See BORK, supra note 160, at 114.
163. GuESs WHO'S COMNG TO DInNER (Columbia Pictures 1967) (a liberal white couple must test their
convictions when their daughter brings home her fiance to dinner, an African-American).
164. This style of liberalism is most recently expressed in Professor Sunstein's latest expression of faith.
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1996). It is interesting to note that process liberalism of this kind, extremely popular in the United
States over the last two or so generations, has begun to gain a sort of respectable toehold in Europe. Consider
Jurgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv.*771, 776 (1996). A number of thoughtful anal-
ysis of Habermas' proceduralism can be found in Symposium, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical
Exchanges, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1996).
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theosis of substantive liberalism into a jurisprudence of English Restoration
comedy of manners:
We might describe the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to
justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided, as 'deci-
sional minimalism.' ... All of these ideas involve the constructive use of
silence. Judges often use silence for pragmatic or strategic reasons or to
promote democratic goals. Of course it is important to study what judges
say; but it is equally important to examine what judges do not say, and
why they do not say it.'
The theory is one of the Court as coquette, flirting with democracy behind
the fan of its decisions; never saying yes, never saying no. An interesting con-
ceptualization of the function of the judiciary--definitely female from the patri-
archal point of view. And so Professor Sunstein's minimalism.es Romer is
good because it decides nothing; it forecloses nothing; it is the zygote that dare
not speak its name. 67 This is the model of classic conservative judging." In
reality it might also be the mark of a Court that does not yet know its own
mind. Less does it know or understand the popular reality-society is struggling
still about how it "really" feels about homosexuals. In that environment, the
Court must remain at its most tentative, for in the end the Court must serve to
recognize political reality, not create it.'69
In the end, I believe Romer demonstrates the power of politics as the vehi-
cle for determining law, and the utility of explaining the law in terms of the
165. See Sunstein, supra note 164, at 6, 7.
166. See id. at 6. Thus, "the case for minimalism is especially strong if the area involves a highly conten-
tious question that is currently receiving sustained democratic attention." Id. at 32. And, yet, there is more
than a whiff of Scalia in Professor Sunstein's view. Consider an earlier articulation of Professor Sunstein's
reticence on such delicate issue as same-sex marriage and referenda such as the Amendment:
Under contemporary conditions, a judicial holding of this sort [requiring states to allow same sex
marriage] would probably be a large mistake, even though the basic principle is sound. It would be
far better for the courts to proceed slowly and incrementally. I have suggested that they should build
on 'rationality review' in the most egregious cases and also invalidate measures that combine restric-
tions on the democratic process with discrimination. Broader rulings should be avoided. Elected offi-
cials, including the president, have somewhat more flexibility in carrying out their own independent
constitutional responsibilities.
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1, 27-28 (1994).
167. According to Sunstein:
Romer combined a degree of caution and prudence with a good understanding of the fundamental
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause and a firm appreciation of the law's expressive function. Thus
understood, Romer was a masterful stroke-an extraordinary and salutary moment in American law.
It was a masterful stroke in part because it left many issues open.
Sunstein, supra note 165, at 9. I do agree that the porousness of Romer was a masterful stroke. I am not so
sure that, as Professor Sunstein characterizes it, that stroke was good.
168. Conservatism, of course, has recently acquired multiple meanings. I refer here, of course, not to the
activist populist conservatism of some aggressive members of the Supreme Court, but rather to the classical
conservatism of judicial restraint, of a philosophy restraining judges from deciding issues other than the nar-
row ones before them in a particular case. On the differences between judicial restraint and interventionist
conservatism on the Court, see Bernard Schwartz, 'Brennan v. Rehnquist' Mirror Images in Constitutional
Constructions, 19 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 213 (1994).
169. This is a point I have argued elsewhere at greater length. See Larry Catfi Backer, Constructing a
"Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States
and British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REv. 529, 538-54 (1996). However, Professor Sunstein recognizes the value of
Romer as cultural artifact as well as law. It "communicate[s] social commitments and may well have major
social effects just by virtue of their status as communication." Sunstein, supra note 164, at 69. But then Bow-
ers had the same effect. See id. at 70-71.
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concurrence of jurisprudence and politics. 7 ' Jurisprudentially speaking at
least, Romer was a little case-a game of dirty pool. Romer illustrates the pow-
er of decisions which recognize at some subliminal level that sex is politics. In
a sense, the Court merely confirmed what our political society had long held
true-that everyone should be allowed to 'play' the game of republican poli-
tics.' "Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may
seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimina-
tion only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitu-
tion."'" The majority sought to do little more than to identify the basic rules
within which republican principles of politics works in this country. These are
not new rules, or rules with no connection to actual practice. The majority di-
rected its inquiry to understanding the way in which Americans played the
political game of republicanism in this century." Indeed, the majority relies
on tradition to support their decision."
Justice Scalia, in dissent, correctly states (though he seems to fail to under-
stand) the strength of that argument. 7 Scalia's dissent, ironically, is also
based on tradition, but of a different kind.'76 In the end, Justice Scalia's tradi-
tional values had to give way to those championed by the majority, and sensi-
bly so--Colorado's legislature is as capable of protecting traditional moral
170. These themes are explored in greater detail in Larry Cafi Backer, Reflections on the Law of 'Moral
and Social Disapprobation' in Romer v. Evans. Conformity and the Political Functions of Courts in the U.S.
and U.K., (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
171. In a recently published article, Michael Mannheimer refers, generally, to the Equal Protection
Clause's "equal citizenship principle." See Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Es-
tablishment Clause: Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 95, 114-
17 (1996).
172. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). Justice Scalia, in dissent, had a far narrower view of
what sort of political participation would be enough. Homosexual political advances are subject "to being
countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as well." Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This includes
"the democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions." Id. at 1635. The problem, of course, as the
majority saw, and as Justice Scalia's ideology could not fathom, is that our popular political culture does not
permit the use of the democratic process to push any participant out of the game. And that is what the amend-
ment at issue in Romer effectively did. The Justices spent some time considering this point at oral argument,
where the issue was crystallized. See Romer v. Evans (No. 94-1039) Official transcript of oral argument,
October 10, 1995, at 51-56, available in 1995 WL 605822. As Jean E. Dubofsky argued on behalf of respon-
dents, the question was whether the referendum process constituted a prohibited "restructuring of the political
process." Id. at 51.
173. This was made quite apparent in oral argument. Thus, for instance, Justice Ginsburg drew analogies
to the political give and take of the suffragists at the turn of the twentieth century. See Romer v. Evans (No.
94-1039) Official transcript of oral argument, October 10, 1995, at 14, available in 1995 WL 605822 ("I was
trying to think of something comparable to this, and what occurred to me is that this political means of going
at the local level first is familiar in American politics.").
174. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the
rule of law and our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.
Id.
175. "Lacking any cases to establish that facially absurd proposition [that the sort of statewide constitu-
tional amendment through referendum at issue in the case], it simply asserts that it must be unconstitutional,
because it has never happened before." Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). That is precisely
the point. Tradition militates against this sort of fundamental wrenching of political culture in the absence of
evidence of a substantial amount of acceptance of these rules in fact.
176. "The Court today.. . employs a constitutional theory heretofore unknown to frustrate Colorado's
reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values." Id.
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values as is the population it represents. In the end, our founders chose for our
political home republican Rome, not democratic Athens.' 7 That choice im-
ports with it a sense of the dignity of each of the citizens of that polity. Romer
is a case in sync with that core social reality. It will survive. The more inter-
esting question, however, is what precisely about Romer, beside its particular
holding, will survive to govern future cases. It is in this form that Romer neces-
sarily leads us back to Bowers v. Hardwick.7
C. Bowers, Bowers, Where Have You Gone?
The issues are easily stated. Was the decision of the Romer Court consis-
tent with Bowers? How does Bowers fit into the analysis of the Romer majority.
Here are questions that will keep litigators, academics and the courts busy for a
long time. The Romer majority was deliberately silent on Bowers. That silence
has opened a tremendous hole-not because the members of the majority do not
know their own minds on the question, but because they chose to throw the
question back to the litigating community.
Many have already rushed in to fill that hole for the Court, not the least of
which have been the Romer dissenters. Justice Scalia seems to have a clear idea
of what the majority was doing. He argues eloquently that Bowers is ultimately
incompatible with Romer. "If it is constitutionally permissible for a state to
make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is a constitutionally permissible
for a state to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.' ' 179 As
he points out, the Amendment targets the homosexual class based on four char-
acteristics: sexual orientation, conduct, practices and relationships. So even if a
person has a homosexual "orientation" and does not engage in such conduct,
Bowers would still provide a rational basis for the Amendment. "If it is rational
to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protec-
tion to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the con-
duct." 80
The only real answer to these questions is-we don't know. It is clear that
read narrowly, Romer is irrelevant to the question. The protection of civil status
in society, the limitations on the ways in which the state may deal with individ-
uals purely as a result of their membership in some group of our creation, re-
main stubbornly aloof from the way in which we analyze the rules for the im-
position of consequences for conduct.'' The fact that a person may be impris-
oned for touching the genitals of another person of the same sex with his or her
mouth or genitals has little to do with the power to impose civil disabilities on
177. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 39 & 63 (James Madison).
178. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
179. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631.
180. Id. at 1632.
181. There has been a mountain of material written on the statuslconduct divide. See, e.g., Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 'Sex,' 'Gender,' and 'Sexual
Orientation' in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994).
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such people because they have been placed within the group of people who
might like to do the same. Recall that the majority invoked a particular tradi-
tion of American political ordering to support its holding. Bowers may well
speak as strongly to a tradition of a different sort. In the more traditionalist
language of Professor Sunstein, "The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
have very different offices, and [Bowers] is not in tension with Romer so long
as those different offices are kept in mind."'"
But there is something to be said for the notion that Justice Kennedy in
Romer does for gay rights and the effort to overturn Bowers what Justice
Ginsburg has done for the effort to subject gender issues to strict scrutiny. The
brilliance of Justice Kennedy's opinion is not that he was able to overrule Bow-
ers by implication-my guess is that he had no' intention of doing that-but
that he was able to craft an opinion that opened up the possibility that the Court
might soon well move in that direction.
One might be tempted to scoff at an opinion which can offer little more
than a possibility. Yet Justice Ginsberg's subtlety in offering the possibility of
recreating the scrutiny standard for females in VMI applies with equal if not
greater force to Justice Kennedy's project in Romer. The possibilities of Romer
are momentous, precisely, because it appeared that such possibility could not
exist, as case law, after Bowers. Justice Scalia understood this quite well in
arguing against the majority's reasoning in Romer. I think everyone does. But
this is another one of those cases where the majority would prefer the interme-
diate courts to do their dirty work for them, and the intermediate courts have
jumped to the task."
The work of the lower courts will be made easier because, read broadly,
the language of Romer is incompatible with Bowers, even though the holdings
of the two cases are not. Robert Bork certainly understands this: "The majority
did not even mention its prior decision that homosexual conduct is not a consti-
tutional right, but it is well on the way to holding that it is."' 4 The incompati-
bilities of the two decisions are fairly easy to spot; Justice Scalia has done an
admirable job of highlighting some of them.s Perhaps more importantly, the
differences with which tradition is viewed in both cases will significantly weak-
en the rationale underlying much of what Bowers offered, making it possible to
ultimately limit that case strictly to its facts.' Justice White, writing in Bow-
ers, placed a significant emphasis on tradition as a key element supporting the
182. Sunstein, supra note 164, at 67.
183. See cases cited supra note 9.
184. See BORK, supra note 160, at 113.
185. Although the majority categorizes Colorado's effort as consisting of animosity towards homosex-
uals, Justice Scalia argues that certain types of "animus" are acceptable. For example, conduct such as mur-
der, polygamy, cruelty to animals is considered reprehensible. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632. That, after all,
was the basis of Bowers. Such was the type disputed here--"ioral disapproval of homosexual conduct." Id.
Although Coloradans have a right to feel hostile to homosexuals, the Amendment is a very conservative dis-
play of this hostility. See id.
186. Patricia Cain, for example, has suggested this as an attainable goal of an anti-Bowers strategy. See
Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Gay and Lesbian Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993).
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continued power of the state to regulate non-heterosexual sexual activity."
Yet the passions which can direct political action following a long tradition of
treating homosexuality in a particular way carries significantly less weight in
the majority opinion in Romer.'
On a more theoretical level, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
there is no rational relationship between the criminalization of private, adult
consensual homosexual activity and any legitimate state policy, if such pro-
fessed policies are subject to the kind of strict-rational-basis-scrutiny exercised
in Romer. This is especially so if we understand broadly the Court's admonition
that moral disapproval, disapproval of a lifestyle that is distasteful, is insuffi-
cient as a basis for legislation which negatively impacts the target. 9 Unhappi-
ly to be sure, traditionalists have recognized this aspect of the equal protection
jurisprudence of the Court. "Moral objections to homosexual practices is not the
same thing as animus, unless all disapprovals based on morality are to be disal-
lowed as mere animus.""9 Richard Posner has reached such a conclusion in
what may well have been a dry run for this sort of argument in his recent book,
Sex and Reason.'9' Lots of people, it seems, are hedging their bets on this
one.
In the end, Romer is at its most important for what it does not do. It does
not foreclose the affirmance of Bowers (though it makes this alternative more
difficult), yet also does not foreclose the limitation of Bowers to its facts. And
there may well be something appealing about abandoning substantive due pro-
cess and substituting for the indeterminacy of that doctrine the potentially more
principled interpretive model of equal protection. Romer even permits the over-
ruling of Bowers and the eventual conflation of sex and sexuality in constitu-
tional jurisprudence." As such, it will be most interesting to see how the
Court resolves the challenge inherent in its decision, so well put by Robert
Bork: "If homosexuality may not be discouraged by state constitutions, it is
187. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986). That his view of the rise and extent of this
tradition was wrong has become a commonplace belief. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality
and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073,
1081-87 (1988).
188. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
189. Cf Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (voiding state food stamp regulation
disallowing eligibility to households containing unrelated persons on rational basis grounds where it was clear
that the regulation meant to target hippie communes). At this point, of course, the arguments-acts versus
status-sneaks in. In a sense, one can characterize the differences between the Romer majority and the dissent
as one of characterization. The majority treated the issue as one of status; the dissent concentrated on the acts
underlying the political action of the people of Colorado. A number of commentators have sought to engage
this status-conduct divide on a variety of different theories. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About
Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In And After
Bowers v. Hardwick," 79 VA. L. REV. 1781 (1993); Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protection for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989); Jacobs, supra note 154; Valdes,
supra note 181, at 31.
190. See BORK, supra note 160, at 113.
191. See RICIARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 181 (1992). His project of imagining sex as a morally
indifferent concept finds significant resonance in the opinion of the Romer majority.
192. For a provocative discussion of the possibilities of this conflation, and perhaps of its necessity, see,
for example, Valdes, supra note 181.
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difficult to see how the provisions of various state constitutions banning polyga-
my can stand. They can't as a logical proposition, but the Court (like modem
liberal culture) is not as solicitous of polygamy as it is of homosexuality."'93
The response to this challenge will tell us much about the interplay of politics
and theory in the Court.
IV. DIVINING MEANINGS AND PoSslBILmES
Each of us would like to play the role of Teiresias.'94 We all know what
the ruminations of the Court really mean, what they auger for the future. We
are assisted in this endeavor by our ideology, our politics, our sociology, our
politics, and our economics; perhaps we are even moved to predict the future
because of these as well. We read the entrails of the oracles of the Court the
way that (Edipus understood the meaning of the Delphic command to rid
Thebes of the murderer of Lalus.'95 In this sense we always tend to read
meaning in ignorance of our own involvement as both judge and judged, and
oblivious to the real consequences of our judging. In the end, and strictly read,
the cases offer us precious little beyond their holdings-no clear bright line
rule, no formula for balancing, no direction for the future. Romer and VMI are
particularly powerful examples of jurisprudence by implication. It will be with
the potentially irreconcilable implications of these cases that those of us who
must interpret and implement the words of the oracles must struggle-until the
oracle speaks again!
193. See BORK, supra note 160, at 113-14.
194. Teiresias was a blind prophet of Thebes, counsellor to CEdipus and his uncle/brother-in-law, Creon,
who was able to discern the meaning of the Gods. See Sophocles, (Edipus the King, in SOPHOCLS: THE
THEiE THEBAN PLAYS 159, 175-85 (Robert Fagles trans., 1984) (441 B.C.?). "The truth and all its power
lives inside me." Id. at 179 (Teiresias).
195. C dipus, of course, was both son and murderer of Laus. He had been sent away from Thebes at an
early age to avoid the consequences of the prophecy that he would murder his father and marry his mother.
As a young man he found out about the prophecy, and, thinking it applied to his adoptive parents (whom he
thought his biological parents), he ran away to Thebes. He murdered his father on the road to Thebes, defeat-
ed the sphinx plaguing the city, and accepted the grateful city's reward-leadership of Thebes and the hand of
the widow of Lalus. The story is richly related in Sophocles, supra note 194. What I am relating here is the
irony inherent in the judicial project of interpreting our basic law.
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